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Constitutional Limitations on the Exemption
of Real Property from Taxation
JOHN M. CAREN*
At this writing, the supreme court and the general assembly are
at odds over the power of the latter to exempt real property from
taxation. The court holds that the legislature is limited by Article
XII, Section 2 of the Constitution to exempting "burying grounds,
public school houses, houses used exclusively for public worship,
institutions used exclusively for charitable purposes, and public
property used exclusively for any public purpose,"' but the legis-
lature is not disposed to agree.
At its regular session last year the 98th General Assembly took
issue with the court by exempting real estate belonging to public
housing authorities from taxation when used for slum clearance
and/or public housing2 under the state housing authority law,3
notwithstanding that the court had already decided (1) that under a
similar, but less forthright, law4 such property could not be ex-
empted as public property used exclusively for a public purpose,5
and (2) that the right to exempt real estate from taxation is limited
to the classes enumerated in Section 2 of Article XII.6 Evidently the
legislature was not in the mood to back down.
The exempting of property from taxation is an incident of the
taxing power vested in the general assembly by Article H, Section
1.' It is aptly described in Article XII, Section 2 as "the general
power * * * to determine the subjects and methods of taxation and
exemptions therefrom." Subject only to limitations contained in the
state and federal constitutions, the free exercise of the power is
within the sole discretion of the legislature.
Under the Ohio Constitution of 1802, the only limitations on the
taxing power were a prohibition against poll taxes and the require-
* Of the firm of Dargusch, Carren, Greek and King.
'Youngstown Housing Authority v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 268 (1944); Hospital
Service Association v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 179 (1944); Zangerle v. Cleveland,
145 Ohio St. 347 (1945); New Orphans Asylum v. Board of Tax Appeals, 150
Ohio St. 219 (1948).
2 Amended House Bill No. 179, 98th General Assembly.
3 OHo GEar. CODE §§ 1078-29 to 1078-50 (1938).
4 Omo GmT. CODE § 1078-36, as effective immediately prior to October 6, 1949.
5 Dayton Housing Authority v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 10 (1944).
6 Youngstown Housing Authority v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 268 (1944).
7 Wasson v. Commissioner, 49 Ohio St. 622, 635 (1892).
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ment of equal protection of the laws.8 In all other respects the
authority of the legislature was absolute. This condition continued
for almost fifty years, but with the passage of time abuses crept in9
and with the adoption of the present Constitution in 1851, legislative
discretion in matters of taxation and tax exemption was drastically
restricted.
The strongest curbs were contained in Article XII, Section 2,
which then read as follows:
Laws shall be passed, taxing by a uniform rule, all
moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint stock
companies, or otherwise; and also all real and personal prop-
erty, according to its true value in money; but burying
grounds, public schoolhouses, houses used exclusively for
public worship, institutions of purely public charity, public
property used exclusively for any public purpose, and per-
sonal property, to an amount not exceeding in value two
hundred dollars, for each individual, may, by general laws,
be exempted from taxation; * * *
The plain intent of this section was to cut off practically all of
the legislature's discretionary powers. All property was required to
be subjected to ad valorem taxation by uniform rule. Nothing was
to be exempted except specified classes of property. All that was left
for the general assembly to do was to fix the rate, impose the taxes
and, if it chose, provide for the specified exemptions. A contempo-
raneous opinion in the case of Exchange Bank of Columbus v. Hines
said that: 10
The manifest effect of this constitutional provision, is
to make property the basis, and the sole basis, of taxation.
And the object being equality and fairness, it requires, by
a true interpretation:
1. That the taxes shall be assessed on all property in
the state, except the subjects of the specified exemptions.
-2. That the taxes shall be assessed on all property,
by a uniform rule. And,
3. That all taxable property shall be taxed at its
true value in money.
For more than three quarters of a century the section remained
in substantially the same form. It was amended in 1905, 1912 and
1918 but the restraints on the legislature were not relaxed. In 1905,
a provision was added, making the bonds of the state and its sub-
divisions tax-exempt and by the 1912 amendment the phrase "in-
stitutions of purely public charity" was changed to "institutions used
8 Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St. 243, 245 (1855); Zanesville v. Richards, 5 Ohio
St. 590, 592, 593 (1855).
9 Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1, 12 (1853).
10 See Note 9, supra, at p. 11.
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exclusively for charitable purposes." Other changes of a minor
nature were made but legislative discretion remained shackled.
It was not until 1929 that the reins on the general assembly were
loosened. In that year the "classification amendment" was adopted
by the electors "to provide for a more flexible system of taxation
for the state and to protect property against excessive taxation ac-
cording to value."'" For those purposes, Article XII, Section 2 was
amended to read as follows:
No property, taxed according to value, shall be so taxed
in excess of one and one-half per cent 12 of its true value in
money for all state and local purposes, * * *. Land and im-
provements thereon shall be taxed by uniform rule accord-
ing to value. All bonds * * * shall be exempt from taxation,
and without limiting the general power, subject to the pro-
visions of article I of this constitution, to determine the
subjects and methods of taxation or exemptions therefrom,
general laws may be passed to exempt burying grounds,
public school houses, houses used exclusively for public
worship, institutions used exclusively for charitable pur-
poses, and public property used exclusively for any public
purpose, * * *
The adoption of the amendment evidenced a drastic change in
public sentiment. Whereas in 1851 the voters had made it mandatory
for the general assembly to pass laws taxing all forms of property
by uniform rule and had left only the fixing of the rate to legislative
discretion, in 1929 they voted to limit the amount of taxes that
could be levied on any property and left everything else to the
discretion of the general assembly, subject only to the requirement
that real property be taxed by uniform rule. In other words, the
legislature was back where it was before 1851 except for having to
observe the uniform rule in taxing real estate and the 15 mill
limitation in taxing all property.
By the omission of the former requirement that all forms of
property be taxed, the amendment likewise restored the discretion-
ary authority of the legislature to grant exemptions, but it was not
until 1937 that the supreme court had the opportunity to gauge the
extent of the restoration. At first glance it appeared more extensive
to the court than it has since. In the opinion of Judge Matthias (Chief
11 The amendment was proposed by the 88th General Assembly. The
question of its adoption was submitted to the electorate, pursuant to House
Joint Resolution No. 8, in the following form:
"Shall article XII, section 2 of the constitution of the state of Ohio be
amended and article XII, section 3 of the constitution of the state of Ohio
be repealed so as to provide for a more flexible system of taxation for the
state and to protect property against excessive taxation according to value?"
12 Article XII, Section 2 was amended again in 1933 but only by changing
the words "one and one-half per cent" to "one per cent"
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Justice Weygandt and Judges Jones, Day, Zimmerman, Williams
and Myers concurring) in State, ex rel. Struble v. Davis13, it was
said that:
It is to be observed that, while Section 2 of Article XII
authorizes certain exemptions recited in the provision prior
to its amendment, in substantially the same language as it
then read, it now very significantly provides: ' * * * without
limiting the general power, subject to the provisions of
Article I of this Constitution, to determine the subjects
and methods of taxation or exemptions therefrom, general
laws may be passed to exempt burying grounds,' etc. As
amended, the Constitution itself now provides that the enu-
meration of certain classes of property which may be
exempted does not take away or limit authority of the Legis-
lature to make other exemptions. Thus, while the uniform
rule was retained as to real estate, full and complete plenary
power to otherwise classify property for taxation and de-
termine exemptions therefrom apparently was restored
substantially as it had existed under the provisions of the
Constitution of 1802.
Apparently the court thought at the time that the amendment
removed all of the restrictions on the taxing power (including the
granting of exemptions) previously contained in Article XII, Section
2 except the uniform rule, which was made to apply only to real
estate. However, the Struble case involved the validity of a statute
exempting personal property and the court decided only that "the
power of the General Assembly to determine the subjects and
methols of taxation and exemption of personal property is limited
only by Article I of the Constitution of the state [equal protection]."
Six years later, a change in the court's estimate of the authority
of the general assembly to exempt real property was forecast
in Ursuline Academy v. Board of Tax Appeals14 . The case involved
the exemption of realty but was decided on grounds other than
the power of the legislature to grant the exemption. The question
was raised, however, and in the opinion announced by Judge Turner
and concurred in by Judges Matthias, Hart and Zimmerman, it was
observed that: 15
The Struble case was limited to the exemption of per-
sonal property, no real estate being involved. Furthermore,
the exemption there in question was contended for under
legislation passed subsequent to the amendment. This legis-
lation had for its purpose the classification of personal
property. The instant case instead of involving personal
property only is limited to real property. For reasons that
's 132 Ohio St. 555, 560, 9 N.E. 2d 684 (1937).
14 141 Ohio St 563, 49 N.E. 2d 674 (1943).
15 See Note 13, supra, at p. 570.
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will follow we do not deem it necessary at this time to de-
termine whether this last-mentioned amendment of Section
2 of Article XII in respect of exemption applies as well to
real property.
This was the first indication of a retreat from the position taken in
the Struble case. The dissenting opinion of Judge Bell, with which
Chief Justice Weygandt concurred, contained the even more
significant statement that: "The power to exempt property from
taxation is granted by Section 2, Article XII of the Ohio Constitu-
tion * * *." This was something new. It had never before been
doubted that tax exemptions are part and parcel of the taxing power
vested in the legislature by Article H, Section 1.16
Finally, in Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority v.
Evatt,17 the Court came out with it. Writing for the majority of the
court (Chief Justice Weygandt, and Judges Matthias, Hart and
Turner) Judge Bell said that:
The Constitution of this state grants to the General As-
sembly authority to pass general laws exempting from
taxation certain specified classes of real property.
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution reads as fol-
lows: '* * * General laws may be passed to exempt burying
grounds, public school houses, houses used exclusively for
public worship, institutions used exclusively for charitable
purposes and public property used exclusively for any
public purpose, but all such laws shall be subject to al-
teration or repeal * * *.'
This provision is a limitation upon legislative power to
grant exemptions ** *
This statement was not necessary to the court's decision. The
case involved the exemption of a housing project under a statute,
Ohio General Code, Section 1078-36, enacted after the adoption
of the classification amendment which declared that property of a
housing authority should "be deemed public property for public
use." The statute contained no express provision for the exemption
of the property. Exemption was sought under Section 5351, which
exempts, inter alia, "public property used for a public purpose."
Exemption was denied by the court on the ground that the property
was not used for a public purpose, notwithstanding the declaration
of the general assembly. However, in the majority opinion, Judge
Bell remarked that:
Section 1078-36, General Code, properly construed, we
think discloses a legislative intention to declare property
acquired, owned, leased, rented or operated by the housing
authority to be deemed public property for public use for
16 Cf. Zangerle v. Cleveland, 145 Ohio St. 347, 351, 61 N.E. 2d 720 (1945).
17 143 Ohio St. 268, 274, 55 N.E. 2d 122 (1944).
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the purposes of public inspection and accounting only and
not for the purpose of exemption from taxation.
This conclusion is fortified by the fact that in both the
94th and 95th General Assemblies bills were introduced to
amend Section 1078-36, General Code, and to provide
therein for the exemption from taxation of such property.
The General Assembly declined to pass either bill. (94th
General Assembly, House Bill 500; 95th General Assembly,
House Bill 91.)
Far from agreeing with the conclusion, the 98th General
Assembly amended Section 1078-3618 in 1949 so that it now provides
that:
All property, both real and personal, acquired or owned
by the housing authority and used for the purpose of ex-
ercising the powers set forth in the housing authority law
shall be public property used exclusively for a public pur-
pose within the meaning of article XII, section 2, of the
constitution, and shall be exempt from all taxation, * * *
This action made up the issues between the general assembly and
the court. By amending the statute the legislature affirmed its
conviction that the use of real estate for slum clearance or public
housing under the housing authority law is a public use of the pro-
perty within the meaning of Article XII, Section 2, notwithstanding
the opinion of Judge Hart to the contrary (Chief Justice Weygandt
and Judges Matthias, Bell and Turner concurring) in Dayton
Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Evatt.19 Furthermore, by speci-
fically exempting the property from taxation rather than by relying
on Section 5351 as it had before, the general assembly asserted its
authority to exempt the real estate under the taxing power despite
the decision in Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority v.
Evatt, supra, and subsequent cases 20 that Article XII, Section 2
"is a limitation upon legislative power to grant exemptions."
The reaction of the general assembly to the limiting of its
powers by the court is interesting but not decisive. The legislature
is entitled to draw its own conclusion as to the uses and purposes of
property which it wishes to exempt from taxation, but its views
are not binding upon the court. They are entitled only "to great
respect," as Judge Hart put it in the Youngstown Housing Authority
case. Also, in the final analysis, the court has the power "to deter-
mine * * * whether the extreme boundary of legislative power has
18 Amended House Bill No. 179.
19 143 Ohio St. 10, 53 NE. 2d 896 (1944).
20 Hospital Service Association v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 179 (1944); Zangerle
v. Cleveland, 145 Ohio St. 347 (1945); New Orphans Asylum v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 150 Ohio St. 219 (1948).
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been reached and passed."2 ' For the time being, at least, the
question of the authority of the general assembly to grant tax
exemptions is settled and the law is summed up in the syllabus in
Zangerle v. Cleveland, in these words: 22
2. The power of the General Assembly to exempt real
property from taxation is limited to the kinds and classes
enumerated in Section 2, Article X of the Constitution.
3. The power of the General Assembly to determine the
subjects and methods of taxation and exemption of per-
sonal property is limited only by Article I of the Con-
stitution. (State, ex rel. Struble v. Davis et al., Tax Comm.,
132 Ohio St., 555, approved and followed.
The court has given no explanation for the abrupt reversal
of its original appraisal of the effect of the classification amendment
on the power of the legislature to exempt real estate. It prepared the
way by noting in the Ursuline Academy case that the precise
question had not been decided in the Struble case but a matter
of such importance as the construction of a constitutional provision
so as to limit a legislative power seems deserving of more attention
than it has received. In the Youngstown. Housing Authority case,
in which it was first decided that Article XII, Section 2 still limits
the power of the legislature to exempt realty, notwithstanding the
classification amendment, the majority opinion merely says that:
In construing constitutional and statutory provisions re-
lating to exemption of property from taxation, there are
two schools of thought, one that such provisions should be
liberally construed, the other that they should be strictly
construed.
By the decisions it is established in Ohio that exemption
statutes are to be strictly construed, it being the settled
policy of this state that all property should bear its pro-
portionate share of the cost and expense of government;
that our law does not favor exemption of property from tax-
ation; and hence that before particular property can be
held exempt, it must fall clearly within the class of property
specified in the Constitution to be exempt.
The foundation upon which that policy rests is that
statutes granting exemption of property from taxation are
in derogation of the rule of uniformity and equality in mat-
ters of taxation. (See 38 Ohio Jurisprudence, 853, Section
114.)
This statement by Judge Bell of the taxing policy of the state seems
to represent the taxing philosophy of the court. The Chief Justice,
who had joined in the opinion in the Struble case, and Judge
Matthias, its author, both concurred in Judge Bell's opinion as
2 1 Board of Education v. State, 51 Ohio St. 531, 540 (1894).
22 See note 15, supra.
1950]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
did Judges Hart and Turner, who were elected to the court after
the Struble decision. Judges Zimmerman and Williams, both of
whom had concurred in the Struble opinion, dissented without
writing an opinion. However, the basis of their dissent undoubtedly
was that the housing project was used exclusively for a public
purpose, and therefore came within the limitation prescribed by
the other members of the court. Judge Zimmerman had written dis-
senting opinions to that effect in Dayton Housing Authority v.
Evatt and in Columbus Housing Authority v. Thatcher23 both
judges concurred in Judge Turner's opinion, in which it was- as-
sumed that Article XII, Section 2 limits the power of the general
assembly to exempt real estate.
The flaw in Judge Bell's statement is that it utterly ignores the
radical change made in the language of Section 2 of Article XII by
the classification amendment. After quoting the provision of the
section authorizing the legislature to exempt certain classes of
real estate, Judge Bell went on to say that:
This provision is a limitation upon legislative power to
grant exemption and first made its appearance in the Con-
stitution of 1851. Although the wording has been slightly
changed by three amendments thereto in the years 1912,
1929 and 1933, the classes of property which the General
Assembly was authorized to exempt by general laws has
remained the same.
The vital words immediately preceding the provision to which
Judge Bell referred,--"and without limiting the general power * * *
to determine the subjects and methods of taxation or exemptions
therefrom"--were passed over in silence. The fact that the manda-
tory language,--"Laws shall be passed, taxing by a uniform rule
* " * [all forms of property] * * *, according to its true value in
money,"-was eliminated from the section was referred to as a
"slight change." In brief, the opinion leaves the impression that the
court had not heard of the classification amendment and was re-
ferring to Article XII, Section 2 as it had been between 1851 and
1929.
The fact is that the taxing policy referred to by Judge Bell
was scrapped in 1929. It can no longer be "the settled policy of
this state that all property should bear its proportionate share of
the cost and expense of government" when the only tangible per-
sonal property subject to ad valorem taxes is such as is used in
business or agriculture. There is no "uniformity and equality"
when taxable personal property is taxed at many different rates;
and it can no longer be said that "our law does not favor exemptions"
23 140 Ohio St. 38, 42 N.E. 2d 437 (1942).
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when there is no express requirement that the legislature tax any
particular form of property. About all that was left of the pre-1929
Section 2 of Article XII is the requirement that land and improve-
ments thereon be taxed by uniform rule. Uniformity, however,
does not import universality. Uniformity refers to the tax rate and
the method of assessment.24 Universality was achieved prior to
1929 by the requirement that: "Laws shall be passed taxing [all
forms of property]", but there is no longer any such requirement
in the Constitution.
These considerations prompt the thought that the court was on
sounder ground in the Struble case than it has been since. In that
case it faced and gave full effect to the phrase: "and without limit-
ing the general power, subject to the provisions of article 1 of this
constitution, to determine the subjects and methods of taxation or
exemptions therefrom, general laws may be passed to exempt bury-
ing grounds," etc., in the Youngstown Housing Authority case
and since, it has scrupulously avoided any reference to the phrase.
The court's present opinion of the meaning of Article XII, Section
2 seems to be based only upon its notion of a proper taxing policy. If
that is the case, then the court has seriously encroached upon the
power of the legislature.
[The following note was received from the Author while the
article was at the press. Ed.]
Since the foregoing was written the majority of the court (Chief
Justice Weygandt and Judges Hart, Matthias, Turner and Zimmer-
man) has continued to hew to the line that the general assembly is
limited to exempting real property of the kinds and classes specified
in Article XII, Section 2,25 but the newcomers on the bench,
Judges Stewart and Taft have taken the opposite view.
In the University of Cincinnati and Cleveland Board of Edu-
cation cases the statutes in question were unconstitutional in the
view of the majority as exceeding the limitations contained in
Section 2 of Article XII, but the votes of Judges Stewart and Taft
were to the contrary and the validity of the statutes, although badly
shaken, was upheld.
26
2 4 Miller v. Korns, 107 Ohio St. 287, 295 (1923).
25 Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St 97, 91 N.E. 2d 480 (1950);
In re University of Cincinnati and Cleveland Board of Education v. Board of
Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 142, 91 N.E. 2d 502 (1950).
26 Article 2, Section 4 of the Constitution provides in part that: "No law
shall be held unconstitutional and void by the Supreme Court without the
concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, * * *."

